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CHAPTER 8 
Security, Mortgages, and Other 
Creditors' Rights 
BERNARD A. RIEMER and WILLIAM E. HOGAN 
A. SURETYSHIP 
§8.I. Premature payment of retained percentages: Surety's rights. 
A contest among a construction contractor for the federal government, 
his subcontractor, and the surety for performance under the subcon-
tract confronted the Supreme Judicial Court in Veneto v. McCloskey 
CO.l The compensated professional surety failed to escape all liability 
on the bond despite the fact that the principal, the subcontractor, had 
been paid in excess of what was due him under a subcontract, providing 
for retention of a specified amount of the money due to the principal. 
The Court discharged the surety only to the extent of the overpayment, 
holding that a compensated surety is not entitled to a general release 
where such overpayment is slight and does not materially alter the risk 
of the surety. The result follows the dictum in the earlier Massachu-
setts case of Museum of Fine Arts v. American Bonding CO.2 
The overpayment of retained percentages in construction contracts 
presents a twofold problem. First, it can be viewed as an alteration of 
the principal's obligation and as to compensated sureties it appears to 
be well established that a compensated surety will be released only to 
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§8.I. ll955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 859, 128 N.E.2d 337. 
2211 Mass. 124, 97 N.E. 633 (1912). Here the Court avoided the issue of the effect 
of premature payments of retained percentages by holding that the moneys involved 
were loaned by the obligee to the principal in a transaction separate from the 
secured contract. The Court said, however, that a release of security by the prin-
cipal would discharge the surety only to the extent of the amount released. 
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the extent of his injury unless the alteration materially increases his 
risk.3 The fact that it is also a release of security by the obligee is 
an extension of this notion since the surety can claim he is injured to 
the extent of the impairment of his right to be subrogated to that 
security. Secondly, the retention of payments by the obligee may 
benefit the surety so long as they are withheld by inducing the princi-
pal to perform his obligation and get the retained moneys. It may be 
in a given case that by premature payment of such retained percent-
ages the obligee can be said to have contributed to the principal's 
default by the payment. This possibility in itself has been held in an-
other jurisdiction to be sufficient for a general release of even a com-
pensated surety.4 
Apparently the granting of such a general release on the "loss of 
an incentive to performance" argument does not consider the possibil-
ity that the overpayment may actually benefit rather than injure the 
surety. The Wisconsin Court, in a case cited by the Massachusetts 
Court in the McCloskey case, held that a compensated surety may not 
be released to any extent if the prt!mature payment actually benefited 
the surety.5 In that decision it appeared that the principal would have 
been forced to default on the contract earlier if he had not received 
and used in performance the premature payment. In these circum-
stances the early payment could only have benefited the surety. The 
present Massachusetts decision apparently would permit the principal 
to avail himself of such facts and prevent even the partial discharge of 
the surety. One may, perhaps profitably, wonder if we are approach-
ing rules of law, at least as to the compensated surety, based on the 
consideration so vigorously urged by Dean Arant that the surety 
should not be released to any extent where the principal has exercised 
good business judgment in dealing with the security.6 
§8.2. Construction bonds: Filing of claims. Mechanical applica-
tions of statutory language offer some comfort to lawyers and judges 
alike. Determinations rendered on this basis may be effortlessly made 
and defended by merely pointing to the words of the statute. Unfor-
tunately, such decisions often produce unfair results and not infre-
quently evoke remedial legislation. An opportunity to travel this 
attractive but somewhat treacherous path was effectively and sensibly 
rejected in Belanger & Sons, Inc. v. Concannon Corp.1 
The Court had previously held that the statutory provisions govern-
ing bonds for materials furnished in connection with county, city, or 
3 Restatement of Security §§128, 132. 
4 O'Neil v. Title Guaranty 8c Trust Co., 191 Fed. 570 (6th Cir. 1911). An excellent 
compilation of cases pertinent to this entire problem is contained in an annotation 
in 127 A.L.R. 10 (1940). 
5 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Eagle River Union Free High School District of Vilas 
County, 188 Wis. 520, 205 N.W. 926 (1925). 
6 Arant, Suretyship §64 (1931). 
§8.2. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 777, 127 N.E.2d 670. 
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§8.3 CREDITORS' RIGHTS 81 
town public building construction did not apply to bonds related to 
housing authority contracts.2 This decision was based upon the sound 
consideration that such housing authorities are distinct corporate en-
tities separate from the municipal corporations by whom and within 
whose territory they are established. Then the General Court enacted 
G.L., c. 277, §40 in 1946, providing that G.L., c. 149, §§28 and 29 shall 
be applicable to housing authorities. These incorporated sections are 
the provisions governing bonds under public construction contracts 
for cities, towns, and counties. In those sections there is the affirma-
tive requirement that to obtain the benefit of the security the subcon-
tractor must, within a specified period, file a sworn statement of his 
claim with the county or city treasurer or the town clerk. The claim-
ant in this case had within the time limitations filed his statement with 
the housing authority but had filed no statement elsewhere. The 
surety sought to defeat the claim on this basis.3 
The Court rejects this mechanical approach and affirms a decree for 
the claimant. The opinion reviews the development of the statute in 
light of the Johnson-Foster Co. case and the futility of filing with any 
official other than the housing authority officer because of the inde-
pendent character of the authority. The Court then offers a caveat 
to anyone tempted to use unthinkingly the mechanical approach, by 
quoting as follows from an opinion4 of rather ancient vintage by Mr. 
Justice Wilde. The Court stated, "It is a 'canon of interpretation 
... that ... [the words of a statute] are to be construed according 
to the common and approved usage of the language considered in con-
nection with the cause of its enactment, the preexisting state of the 
law, the mischief to be remedied and the main object to be accom-
plished.' " 
§8.3. Wife's liability as husband's surety. In H. F. Reisser's Sons v. 
Parker,! Judge Aldrich of the United States District Court furnished 
an analysis and construction of a contract under Massachusetts law 
which is both interesting and illuminating as to the usefulness of 
surety concepts. The action against a wife individually and as ad-
ministratrix was brought by the seller under a written contract, some-
what indefinite as to price, for the sale of chickens and poultry sup-
plies. The contract was signed by both the defendant wife and her 
now deceased husband. The seller was to be paid from the proceeds 
of the resale of the chickens, but because of a diseased condition the 
2 Johnson·Foster Co. v. D'Amore Construction Co., 314 Mass. 416, 50 N.E.2d 89 
(1943). The provisions as to bonds on county, city, and town construction contracts 
were embodied in G.L., c. 149, §§28, 29. 
3 The Court had previously held that a total failure to file a notice of the claim 
under this type of transaction resulted in the supplier losing his rights to the 
security. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., 330 Mass. 319, 113 N.E.2d 
226 (1953). 
4 Somerset v. Dighton, 12 Mass. 383 (1815). 
§8.3. 1 126 F. Supp. I (D. Mass. 1954). 
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resale did not bring an amount equal to the price. The resale price 
was paid by check made payable jointly to the husband and the plain-
tiff. The husband, however, refused to endorse the check. The court 
held that the ambiguity as to price was resolved by the husband's subse-
quent conduct in accepting supplies at invoiced prices and acknowl-
edging the gross amount due when he repudiated. The court held 
the wife liable as administratrix only for the check, accepting the con-
tention that a Massachusetts statute limiting liability of administra-
tors and executors applied to the balance claimed.2 Further, the court 
concluded that even though the wife individually signed the contract, 
she could not be held bound to it. Although she could contract with a 
third party, she could not be held to be bound by the husband's subse-
quent conduct resolving the ambiguity in this contract, because she 
could not as a matter of law be a joint venturer with her husband,3 
and was not as a matter of fact his principal conferring upon him 
authority to agree on the price. 
But the plaintiff, as the court said, had "one more string to its bow" 
since the contract contained a promise that the "Consignees [the hus-
band and wife] hereby guarantee the full payment of all bills and 
accounts for chicks and feed and fire insurance premium, furnished 
by the consignor [seller] possession of which may be delivered to them 
hereunder." The court held that this provision made the wife liable 
as a surety even though she may have been active in the transaction as 
a principal in a legally ineffective manner. There is apparently no 
violence done in this result either to the terms of the contract nor to 
the statutory disabilities of the wife. The construction also gives effect 
to a provision of the contract which would otherwise have little or 
no meaning. 
If the wife is not the sole beneficiary of the deceased's estate, a 
question as to her rights qua surety against the estate may arise. She 
appears to be clearly entitled to exoneration and subrogation under 
prior case law.4 There is some doubt however as to her right of re-
imbursement or indemnification from the principal or his estate, since 
2 G.L., c. 197, §1 provides "An executor or administrator shall not be held liable 
to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased commenced within six months 
after his giving bond for the performance of his trust, unless such action is brought 
for the recovery of a demand which would not be affected by the insolvency of the 
estate ... " The court held that since the plaintiff had at least a joint title to the 
check that question is not affected by the insolvency of the estate. 
3 G.L., c. 209, §2 prohibits contracts between husband and wife and has been 
frequently held to invalidate partnerships as between husband and wife members, 
e.g., Lord v. Parker, 3 Allen 127 (Mass. 1861); Voss v. Sylvester, 203 Mass. 233, 89 
N.E. 241 (1909). 
4 Browne v. Bixby, 190 Mass 69, 76 N.E. 454 (1906) (exoneration); Fitcher v. 
Griffiths, 216 Mass. 174, 103 N.E. 471 (1913) (subrogation). The equitable nature 
of these actions avoided any objection based upon the wife's disability to sue the 
husband because statutes like G.L., c. 209, §6 are held merely to continue the com· 
mon law disability to sue at law. Frankel v. Frankel, 173 Mass. 214, 53 N.E. 398 
(1899). 
4
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this may be viewed as an implied in fact contract between the wife-
surety and the husband-principal. The right of the surety to reim-
bursement can however also be viewed as a quasi-contractual obliga-
tion imposed solely by the law on the parties without any of the for-
malities of express contract. As such it should be a right available to 
the wife in the instant case.5 It seems hardly wise to conclude that the 
statutes at least partly designed to protect the wife do not prohibit 
her taking on the burdens of the surety but forbid her from availing 
herself of the protection normally given to the surety. 
§8.4. Assignment for the benefit of creditors: Municipal tax col-
lector's rights. In Collector v. Slafskyl a difficult problem of construc-
tion was resolved by the Court utilizing public policy considerations 
as to the payment of personal property and excise taxes. The munici-
pal tax collector brought an action against the assignee for the benefit 
of creditors to recover such taxes assessed prior to the assignment. 
The purpose of the assignment as set forth in the instrument was to 
distribute the proceeds of the debtor's estate 
in substantial conformity with the laws of said Commonwealth re-
lating to the estates of insolvent debtors, paying debts of said 
part [sic] of the first part due and owing to the parties of the 
third part entitled to priority under said laws, in full, should the 
net proceeds of the trust property be sufficient therefor, otherwise 
pro rata in the order provided for by the laws of said Common-
wealth relating to the estates of insolvent debtors and applying 
the balance of said proceeds equally and ratably, without prefer-
ence or priority, to the payment of such debts, obligations and 
liabilities of the party of the first part to the parties of the third 
part as are provable against the estate of insolvent debtors under 
the laws of said Commonwealth, and are not entitled to priority 
under said laws . . . 
The Court held that the tax collector was not a creditor; therefore, he 
was not compelled to assent to the assignment. This result stemmed 
from the Court's reliance upon an earlier case, Boston v. Turner,2 
5 Major v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 108 (1878), holding that wife is personally liable on 
promissory note signed by herself and deceased husband based solely on debt of 
husband since Acts of 1874, c. 184, does not prevent joint promises to third persons. 
The Court added that no contract of indemnity could be made or implied as be· 
tween husband and wife in such a case but that was of no import in the case since 
the contract of indemnity between principal and surety is no part of, and nowise 
affects, their contract with the creditor. 
§8.4. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667, 127 N.E.2d 309. 
2201 Mass. 190, 87 N.E. 634 (1909). The holding in this case that a tax is not a 
debt has had a wide influence. In Nichols v. Commissioner, 314 Mass. 285, 50 
N.E.2d 76, 147 A.L.R. 130 (1943), it was held that interest paid on delinquent fed· 
eral income tax was not deductible as interest on a debt for state income tax pur· 
poses. It is also noteworthy that the priority given to debts due to the United States 
by Rev. Stat. 3466, 31 U.S.C.A. §191 (1954), has been repeatedly assumed to include 
taxes, e.g., Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 67 Sup. Ct. 340, 91 L. Ed. 348 (1946). 
5
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where it was clearly established as Massachusetts law that a tax is not 
. describable as a debt. 
Nonetheless the Court in the Turner case and now in the Slafsky 
case concludes that the tax collector is a beneficiary of the trust. The 
language in the Turner case quite clearly evidenced an intent to in-
clude other than creditors as beneficiaries,3 while here the instrument 
might fairly be read to evidence an intent to include only creditors. 
The Court held in the Slafsky case that the reference to distribution 
in accordance with insolvency laws of the Commonwealth is enough 
to make the collector a beneficiary since that law provides a prefer-
ence to taxes assessed by municipalities.4 
Basic considerations of public policy as to the collection of taxes 
seemed to move the Court to this interpretation.5 The Slafsky deci-
sion's use of this policy merely as a guide to the interpretation of the 
specific language of the instrument may prove awkward for the Court. 
If an instrument is in the future presented which provides only for 
distribution to creditors generally or specifically excludes tax collec-
tors as beneficiaries the approach of interpretation will result either 
in the erosion of the basic policy consideration as to the collection of 
taxes or the painful torturing of the language utilized in the instru-
ment. Other jurisdictions have not hesitated to hold that although 
the state is not bound to the assignment as a creditor because a tax is 
not a debt, it has an automatic preference over other claims by reason 
of its sovereign prerogative.6 This approach escapes the necessity of 
squeezing language of the instrument to find a drop of an intent to 
include the tax authority as a beneficiary. 
§8.5. Realty security as debt for another. The use of extrinsic 
evidence to show the indebtedness to secure which a real estate mort-
gage is given, is set forth in Miller v. Perry.1 The finding in this case 
reaffirms that where a wife joins in a mortgage of her separate realty 
to secure a debt of her husband, her estate is security for his debt, 
even though the debt is the same for which the husband and his estate 
are primarily liable. 
The wife executed the mortgage which included the words ". . . as 
3 Boston v. Turner, note 2 supra. There, the instrument provided that the as-
signee was "to pay in full such claims against parties of the first part as are entitled 
to priority by law, including herein such claims as would be entitled to priority 
under the United States bankrupt law of 1898 as now in force." 
4 G.L., c. 216, §Il8. But for the reference to this statute in the instrument, its 
provisions would not control because of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
5 Mr. Chief Justice Qua states, "It would be strange indeed if an assignment ob-
viously intended as a means of liquidating the affairs of an insolvent should exclude 
all provisions for the payment of taxes which are so generally recognized as preferred 
claims in insolvency proceedings." 
6 Courtney v. Byram, 54 Cal. App. 2d 769, 129 P.2d 721 (1942); In re Rockaway 
Paint Centre, 294 App. Div. 66, 291 N.Y.Supp. 341 (1934); In re Harris, 184 Okla. 
459,88 P.2d 372 (1939). 
§8.5. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 926, 129 N.E.2d 143. 
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provided in our note," although she never did sign any such note. 
The Court held that the trial judge was, not plainly wrong in finding 
that the wife executed the mortgage as security for a note previously 
executed by the husband. The case illustrates the propriety of in-
troducing extrinsic evidence not only to identify the indebtedness se-
cured by the mortgage but also to show the amount of that indebted-
ness. Coupling these considerations with the Marshall v. Francis 
decisions? holding that a recorded mortgage can remain "dormant, 
unrecognized and unenforced for nearly a century and then be recog-
nized as an encumbrance on the fee" 3 simply because of the fact 
that a discharge has not been recorded, we find adequate grounds for 
agreeing with the warning of another commentator on the Marshall 
case, "Conveyancers beware I " 4 
B. MORTGAGES 
§8.6. Mortgagee in possession; Right to compensation. The case 
of Kacouris v. Loukas1 presents interesting facts dealing with the time 
of judgment, as well as with an accounting after mortgage foreclosure. 
On March 29, 1948, the plaintiff brought a tort action against the de-
fendant and, by special precept, made valid attachments of the real 
estate of the defendant. O,n April 10, 1951, an agreement for judg-
ment was reached by all interested parties which stated among other 
things that the further entry might be made, "execution may issue on 
or after March 20, 1951." On the same day, a Tuesday, the clerk of 
court made an entry of judgment and that execution be issued after 
March 20, 1955. On April 12, 1951, a Thursday, the defendant 
filed a motion to strike from the record the agreement for judgment 
filed on the previous Tuesday. This motion was denied on May 3, 
1951, a Thursday. The clerk thereafter, allowing three days exclusive 
of Sunday for filing a claim of exceptions, and twenty days for filing 
exceptions or claim of appeal, on May 28, 1951, made the following 
entry on the docket: "Judgment for the plaintiff ... Execution is-
sued May 29, 1951." Between the entry of the tort action and the 
filing of the agreement for judgment, several mortgagees foreclosed 
on mortgages executed before the attachments, and there was in the 
hands of these mortgagees surplus proceeds. On June 21, 1951, the 
plaintiff brought the first of these suits to reach and apply the surplus 
proceeds. The plaintiff alleged that within thirty days from the date of 
judgment, May 21, 1951, he preserved his attachment by levying on 
2331 Mass. 51, 117 N.E.2d 145 (1954); 332 Mass. 282, 124 N.E.2d 803 (1955). 
3 The authors of Chapter 10 of the 1954 ANNUAL SURVEY, in Section lO.3, seek 
the aid of the legislature in resolving the practical dilemma created by the Marshall 
v. Francis result. 
4 Stein, Conveyancers Beware, 25 Boston Bar Bull. 295 (1954). 
§8.6. 1 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 793, 127 N.E.2d 783. 
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his execution. A second suit involved the same situation. A third 
suit was a petition to restrain Kacouris from levying an execution on 
another parcel of real estate. 
The Court held among other things that the entry on April 10, 1951, 
was the only proper entry and issue of execution that was valid. All 
other entries were immaterial and void. The acceptance of the mo-
tion to strike the agreement from the record was a nullity. The 
defendant's proper course, if he had any rights, was by a petition to 
vacate the judgment. Under G.L., c. 235, §l, as changed by Rule 79 
of the Superior Court Rules of 1932, judgment and civil actions shall 
be entered by the clerk on the Monday of each week on written agree-
ment of the parties filed with the clerk. Judgment may be entered 
with the clerk on any day without further order. The filing of the 
agreement for judgment was a waiver of all exceptions and appeals, 
so that the time for filing such exceptions and appeals as provided in 
G.L., c. 231, §§1l3 and 96 need not be taken into account. 
It was further held that a mortgagee who was also an attorney, and 
who also personally managed property upon which he had foreclosed, 
had a right to deduct from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale a rea-
sonable amount for compensation to him for legal and management 
services. 
C. CREDITORS' RIGHTS 
§8.7. Security for rent; Effect of petition in bankruptcy; Creditors' 
rights. An interesting and significant case dealing with the rights of 
landlord and tenant, and the effect of proceedings in the bankruptcy 
court upon security deposit made by a tenant under a lease, for faith-
ful performance of the terms of the lease, was decided in December, 
1954, in Ghoti Estates, Inc. v. Freda's Capri Restaurant, Inc. 1 This 
was a suit to recover for use and occupation of premises and for water 
used on said premises between September 12, 1952, and Novem-
ber 3, 1952. Defendant alleged payment, eviction and surrender and 
by declaration in set-off sought to recover $10,000 under a "security 
agreement" under a lease between the plaintiff and defendant. 
The facts are as follows: The defendant entered into a lease with 
the plaintiff's assignor for a term of ten years beginning January 1, 
1952. Among other usual provisions, there was provided the follow-
ing: paragraph 8, "If a petition in bankruptcy is filed by the lessee 
... or if a receiver ... shall be appointed ... the lessor may ... 
enter ... the demised premises ... and upon entry ... this lease 
shall determine [indemnification for actual loss of rent for remainder 
of term]." Paragraph 9 provided: "And for the more effoctual secur-
ing to the lessor of the rent ... filing of any petition in bankruptcy 
or insolvency by the lessee . . . deemed . . . breach . . . and . . . 
§8.7. 1332 Mass. 17, 123 N.E.2d 232 (1954). 
8
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ipso facto ... lease terminated." (Immediate contract action with 
fair value mitigation.) 
The parties also entered into a "security agreement" by which the 
defendant deposited $10,000 with the plaintiff "as security for the full 
faithful and punctual performance of the lessee's terms, covenants and 
conditions contained in the said lease for the full term of the said 
lease." In June 9, 1952, the defendant filed a petition for an ar-
rangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, which petition 
alleged insolvency in the equity sense. The petition rejected the lease 
with the plaintiff. On June 11, 1952, a receiver was appointed of the 
property of the debtor. On September 11, 1952, a referee in Bank-
ruptcy confirmed the arrangement, apparently after acceptance by 
creditors. The receiver paid the plaintiff the fair rental value of the 
premises for the period of his receivership up to and including Sep-
tember 11, 1952. The plaintiff claimed a. breach of the lease by vir-
tue of the filing of a petition for an arrangement. On November 3, 
1952, the plaintiff instituted an action of summary process to recover 
some of the premises which ended in an agreement for judgment for 
the plaintiff. The Court held that paragraphs 8 and 9 of the lease 
above referred to must be read together, and that the plaintiff could 
avail itself of the provisions of either paragraphs 8 or 9 of the lease in 
its discretion, and thus the filing of the petition or the appointment 
of the receiver constituted a breach of the lease. There was no pay-
ment of the rent for the whole period of the lease after breach, nor 
did the plaintiff's action to evict the defendant after confirmation 
constitute a defense, as this occurred after the breach of the defendant. 
Nor was there any surrender in a legal sense, as only negotiations for 
same were proved. The Court refused to order the return of the se-
curity deposit holding that the plaintiff could retain same until De-
cember 31, 1961, when it could determine the actual loss to it of the 
lease by virtue of paragraph 8 of the lease. 
It is noted that paragraph 9 of the lease called for an automatic 
termination of the lease upon the filing of the petition of insolvency, 
while paragraph 8 of the lease stated (as to the facts here) that if a 
receiver was appointed, the lessor might enter the demised premises 
and upon entry this lease should determine. Up to the date of the 
action involved here, there was no showing that the lessor had entered 
the demised premises, and thus it did appear that the lease had not 
terminated. It is interesting to understand why the Court held that, 
on the facts before it, the lessor could avail itself of paragraph 8 of 
the lease. Without the availability of this paragraph, it would seem 
that the Court should have required the return of the deposit less any 
damages the plaintiff suffered according to paragraph 9 of the lease. 
Moreover, since paragraph 9 calls for an automatic termination upon 
filing a petition of insolvency, and since a receiver was appointed 
after such an automatic termination did occur, it would seem that the 
plaintiff could not then avail itself to its right to enter and terminate, 
9
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as such had already occurred. It is true that paragraphs 8 and 9 are 
inconsistent at least as to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. Para-
graph 8 provided for entry and termination in that event and para-
graph 9 for automatic termination. The Court seems to feel that the 
language at the beginning of paragraph 9, "and for the most effectual 
security to the lessor of the rent," amounted to the inclusion in para-
graph 9 of such language as "at the option of the lessor the lease shall 
be automatically terminated." This construction, impliedly made, 
without analysis, may be subject to some criticism. 
In any event, the decision in this case points up the necessity for the 
detailed examination of bankruptcy clauses in leases, at least when a 
security deposit is put up. It is extraordinary that after a landlord 
evicts a tenant, in fact (if not in law), he can keep a security deposit 
until he has determined his actual loss of rent for the remainder of the 
term and without requiring him to deduct the fair value of the prem-
ises. If the defendant wished to continue his possession he could not 
have done so, although the full rental of the premises would be de-
ducted from his deposit for the period when he would have occupied 
but while no other tenant was paying rent, either because of a lack of 
effort to obtain another tenant by the landlord, or because of the un-
availability of such a tenant. (Note that the Court, although relying 
upon the defendant's rejection of the lease, did not go into the question 
of when such rejection became operative. Although the Bankruptcy 
Act provides that the confirmation of a Chapter XI plan constitutes 
the rejection of a lease mentioned in the plan, there is nothing in the 
act which indicates whether or not the rejection is operative as of the 
date of confirmation, or whether one can look back to the date of 
the filing of the petition.) 
10
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